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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:221 monopolies and "sought to avoid the granting of patents on 'old' validated as lacking novelty, 6 but the validity of the American patents remained intact. The central reason for this difference is that unlike European patent law, the United States patent code distinguishes between prior knowledge and use in foreign countries and prior knowledge and use in the United States. 7 Specifically, American patent law does not recognize as prior art knowledge and use in a foreign country, such as that involved in the neem case. 8 This geographic disparity in the American patent code has been the subject of much criticism, 9 most recently by Professor Margo A. Bagley of Emory University School of Law. 10 In her well-written article, Professor Bagley contends that the geographic limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 is unconstitutional and bad policy.
11 I challenge those assertions. By advocating the elimination of this geographic disparity and thereby allowing foreign knowledge and use to serve as prior art, Professor Bagley seeks to protect developing nations and indigenous peoples from Western countries' patent law regimes. 12 In contrast, I argue for a proactive approach whereby patent rights serve not only to induce the commercialization of products derived from traditional knowledge, but also to compensate the keepers of traditional knowledge, while respecting the need to conserve the host country's biodiversity. 13 Under this approach, the geographic disparity in American patent law is crucial.
Professor Bagley asserts that the geographic distinction in § 102 is unconstitutional because it "allows the patenting of inventions in the public domain." 14 According to Professor Bagley, the Framers of the Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause), expressed in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, were skeptical of 36257&ID=EP+++0436257B1+I+. 6. See Press Release, Eurpean Patent Office, "Neem tree oil" case: European patent No. 0436 257 revoked (MONTH DAY, YEAR), http://www.europeanpatentoffice.org/news/pressrel/2000_05_11_e.htm. The invalidated European patent was specifically challenged by two Indian non-governmental organizations.
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (2000) . 8. See id. Although foreign knowledge and use cannot be used as prior art, foreign inventive activity (i.e., conception and reduction to practice) can serve as proof of date of invention for purposes of obtaining patent rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000) .
9. See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About Current U.S. Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001) ; Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Tree Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997 
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and "sought to avoid the granting of patents on 'old' information." 15 Novelty is indeed the sine qua non of patent protection, but I believe Professor Bagley's conception of the "public domain" is too broad and does not fully take into account the utilitarian nature of American patent law. 16 While it is true that the Framers drafted the IP Clause in the shadow of abusive monopolistic practices, 17 the driving force behind the clause was the enhancement of public welfare.
18 Section 102 of the patent code is consistent with utilitarianism because the geographic distinction provides an incentive to invest in and commercialize products derived from traditional knowledge-products that otherwise would most likely remain undeveloped or out of reach for a vast majority of potential beneficiaries.
19 Moreover, the wealth created from commercialization could, indeed should, be shared with the host country and keepers of the ADMINISTRATION 1787 ADMINISTRATION -1836 ADMINISTRATION 39 (1998 . According to one scholar, "it is precisely because the delegates were familiar with the Statute of Monopolies . . . that they were not about to give the Congress any general power to create monopolies. . . . If therefore they were to give power to Congress to secure exclusive rights for limited times to inventors in their discoveries, it was necessary to do so expressly.
18. As the Supreme Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954 Furthermore, Professor Bagley's market-differential scenario is unremarkable given the lack of uniformity among patent law regimes. The availability of a patent on any type of inventive contribution varies from country to country, depending on eligible subject matter or a particular reading of patentability requirements. Consider, for example, how American patent law treats biotechnology vis-à-vis the European patent law. In 1998, the European Parliament, concerned about the competitive threat of a robust American biotech industry, issued a biotechnology directive codifying patent protection for biotech-related inventions. 28 The directive was over ten years in the making and has been adopted by only a minority of EC member states, despite a deadline of July 30, 2000. One of the principal points of contention among several countries 29 and political parties 30 in adopting the directive continues to be the patenting of DNA sequences, which is stridently opposed on grounds of public morality.
31 This intra-EU discordance over biotech patents highlights an important distinction between the American and European patent systems. 31. In an attempt to address this concern, Article 6(1) of the Directive states that inventions are "unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality." European Parliament Directive, supra note 28, art. 6(1) at 18. This section mirrors Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which excludes from patent protection "inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality." European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53(a) 'Y 247, 249 (2000) . "Although courts once relied on 'moral utility' to deny patent protection for inventions used solely for gambling or fraud, no court has relied on this doctrine since the PTO Board of Appeals held that an invention used solely for gambling could be patentable in the 1977 decision of Ex parte Murphy." Id.
226
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:221 Like its counterpart in the United States, the European Patent Office (EPO) has issued patents on human DNA. 32 Contrary to the American system, however, a patent granted by the EPO matures into individual national patents (as designated by the applicant), which are governed by their respective national laws. There is no such thing as a European patent that is valid throughout the entire EU. Member states, which often have divergent interpretations of the European Patent Convention, retain jurisdiction over issues of infringement and scope of patent protection, 33 thus increasing the likelihood of disparate enforcement. 34 Therefore, while great strides have been made toward patent harmonization within the EU and throughout the world, uniformity among nations remains unrealized.
35
Professor Bagley also notes that the United States condemns the pirating of American intellectual property by trading partners, yet the geographic disparity in § 102(b) "facilitates the 'pirating' of unpatented, unpublished, traditional knowledge." 36 I agree that the United States has been willing to "push and prod developing countries into accepting intellectual property rules,"
37 and that Western firms should compensate keepers of traditional knowledge. 38 As Professor Balgey notes, however, , 1999) 34. An oft-cited example of disparate enforcement is the "Epilady" patent litigation in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
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traditional knowledge is unpublished 39 and, I would suggest, underutilized. The virtue of a patent is its ability to "smoke out" this knowledge and to provide an inducement for firms to develop products derived therefrom⎯products that otherwise may not be realized. I am not suggesting that patent rights can solve all suboptimal innovation patterns across all industries, and I am sympathetic to concerns prompted by recent proprietary trends in intellectual property law. My focus here is only on pharmaceuticals, an industry that relies heavily on patent rights.
40
In addition, Professor Bagley argues that the geographic distinction no longer makes sense because information is generally more accessible today than it was in 1836, when the distinction found its way into the patent law.
41 Though the assumed rationale for the geographic limitation may be anachronistic, 42 doing away with it (and therefore the prospect of patent rights) would obstruct wealth creation. Professor Bagley suggests, however, that even if the geographic distinction is removed, pharmaceutical firms "can still deliver new drugs based on traditional knowledge" as long as the drugs are novel and nonobvious. 43 Perhaps, but I am not as sanguine as she. First, the pharmaceutical company brings something to the table by way of testing and refining products-endeavors that are quite costly and not necessarily lacking in inventive contribution. Second, and more directly responsive, establishing and documenting the precise prior art parameters of traditional knowledge, preserved mainly in oral histories, is a difficult undertaking. 44 The aforementioned uncertainties brought about by a change to § 102 would weaken the prospect of a strong property right. As a result, in the pharmaceutical industry, private ordering and benefit-sharing would suffer because traditional knowledge will not be optimally commercialized. 47 While it is true that this argument can apply to domestic knowledge OF ESSAYS 68 (Robert E. Johannes ed., 1989).
There is indeed a movement afoot to document traditional knowledge. Sept. 1, 2003) . The goals of this movement, however, must be defined. According to the World Bank, the "ultimate objective" of its internet-based indigenous knowledge program "is to help mainstream indigenous/traditional knowledge into the activities of development partners and to optimize the benefits of development assistance, especially to the poor." Id. If the goal is to create patent-destroying prior art, then this movement seems to be misguided for reasons discussed in this essay, but it makes sense if the goal is to provide for a centralized database of traditional knowledge with an eye towards commercial exploitation. One must be careful, however, not to disclose too much, lest prior art be created. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992) . According to a report by the Office of Technology Assessment, "Individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in hopes of getting access as 'free riders.' The inability to exclude free riders distorts market signals and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods and underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities." Id. For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with them, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 33-38, 107-10, 120-22, 167-72 (2004) .
47. For a discussion of a commercialization-based patent system supported by a strong property right, see 'Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942) .
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GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY 229 (i.e., knowledge within the United States), it is not my intent to read the knowledge and use provisions out of the patent code. Rather, I believe there is something special about traditional knowledge in developing countries. Specifically, the patenting and commercial exploitation of products based on their traditional knowledge can bring much needed capital to these countries and their indigenous populations.
48
Professor Bagley and I are on common ground when she argues that indigenous peoples deserve to be compensated for the commercial exploitation of their traditional knowledge. 49 This concern is important, however the problem here is not the availability of patent protection but rather the lack of an adequate compensatory mechanism for developing nations and indigenous peoples. 50 Safeguards must be put in place so as to prevent "biopiracy" similar to the Hoodia cactus incident. 51 The availability of patent protection must be accompanied by a compensatory structure and mutual consent so that the keepers of traditional knowledge will be equitably compensated, the sovereignty of the host nation respected, and its biodiversity conserved.
One way to accomplish these goals is through a contractual arrangement and a notification provision 52 that are consistent with the aims 48. Even if traditional knowledge were properly catalogued and thus rendered prior art under the current version of § 102, we may nonetheless want to treat this prior art as non-patent defeating. That is, if our goal is to provide incentives to commercialize products derived from traditional knowledge and enhance benefit-sharing opportunities, it may be desirable to have a developing nation prior art exception. This proposal may also help address the "how much to disclose" problem associated with documentation efforts discussed by Professor Visser. See supra note 44.
49. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 689 (noting the lack of equitable compensation for use of traditional knowledge).
50. See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273 (asserting "that the exploitation of traditional peoples and communities, including holders of [traditional knowledge], is fundamentally due to a widespread failure to respect their basic rights"). Every document shall specify the registration number of the contract affording access to genetic resources and a copy thereof where the goods or services for which protection is sought have been manufactured or developed from genetic resources, or products thereof, of which one of the member countries is the country of origin. Id. Consent could be subsumed within the duty to disclose all information material to patentability under 37 C. 53. See Ricolfi, supra note 31, at 85. According to Professor Ricolfi, "a missing link is bound to remain unless appropriate cooperation by recipient states is not . . . put in place." Id. In addition to domestic action, many countries, organizations, and scholars have argued that TRIPS, which does not address protection of traditional knowledge, should be amended to reflect the need for equitable compensation and consent, thereby aligning TRIPS more closely with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)⎯an "international legal framework that has sought to encourage the formation of mutually beneficial relationships between providers and users of genetic resources based on a concept of bilateral agreement. " See, e.g PATENT LAW 82, 84-85 (Chisum et al. eds., 2001 ) (discussing the differences between TRIPS and CBD). For instance, Kenya, on behalf of the African group, proposed a footnote be added to Article 27. Nov. 20, 1999) , available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ DDFDocuments/t/WT/min01/DEC1.doc (adopted Nov. 14, 1999 (Feb. 2001) ; see also Pretorius, supra note 52, at 187-88 (asserting that "TRIPS should . . . contain a requirement that the enforcement of patent rights should be subject to the disclosure, at the time of registration, of the country of origin of biological materials and/or traditional knowledge"). The United States, however, has resisted amendments to TRIPS relating to traditional knowledge, prompting commentators such as Professor Graham Dutfield to remark, "It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect [traditional knowledge] will be inserted into TRIPS anytime soon." Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273.
54. I use this term only to refer to a mutually beneficial contract between a developing nation and either a private concern (e.g., a pharmaceutical company) or a developed nation. Sometimes these agreements are referred to as "Material Transfer Agreements" (MTAs A properly drafted bioprospecting agreement should be consistent with the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). See supra note 53; see also WIPO Operational Principles, supra (providing information on extant contractual practices and related intellectual property clauses for access to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources); McManis, supra note 21, at 270 (noting that a "consensus is developing among scientists, world bodies, anthropologists, and conservationists, that the best way for developing countries to capture the benefits of biodiversity is through a system of intellectual property, environmental, and contractual protection designed to harmonize the goals of development and conservation by building an international framework for sustainable biodiversity prospecting").
55. INBio states that it is an "institution leader in the search and popularization of the knowledge about biodiversity and its sustainable uses" and its mission is to "[p]romote a new awareness of the value of biodiversity, and thereby achieve its conservation and use to improve the quality of life." Instituto Nacional de Biodiveridad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/default.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003 
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:221 formation about how these samples have been traditionally used. 57 Merck is also obligated to pay INBio royalties on future sales of products developed from the samples, which in turn are to be invested, in part, in conservation efforts.
58
The seed for this type of contractual agreement was planted by the idea of "chemical prospecting," which Thomas Eisner, who coined the phase, defined as an "exploratory process by which new, useful natural products are discovered." 59 Eisner advocated that developing nations, because of their geographic proximity to and interest in conserving their biodiversity, could act as screening laboratories that would, in a noninvasive manner, search natural products for chemical and biological activities and isolate the active components of these products. 60 According to Eisner:
The inevitable follow-up to the discovery of chemical uses of selected organisms would be the establishment of working linkages with universities and industries⎯initially, perhaps, mostly in developed nations⎯that would undertake the characterization and synthesis of the active chemicals uncovered. At that stage, proprietary arrangements could be made to insure that profits derived from the eventual commercialization of the new chemicals revert in fair measure to the nations that did the screening. 58. See Bioprospecting Agreement, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm. INBio describes their bioprospecting agreements as follows:
Each agreement has its corresponding work plan and research budget that establishes a 10% donation to the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) (Ministry of the Environment and Energy), which helps cover direct biodiversity conservation costs. Furthermore, it contributes to increasing services, species identification, sample collection and preparation, collection records, information management, training, management. . . . . . . In prospecting, the processes are executed in conjunction with research centers, universities, and national and international companies. This network of associations makes state-of-the-art technologies available and provides the opportunity to rapidly and efficiently train Costa Rican scientists as well as laboratory and field personnel. At the same time, this type of collaboration generates financial resources that are used to fund the country's conservation activities, and also other research projects oriented towards satisfying the demands of users who contribute to the country's sustainable development.
Id.
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